The Battle of Midway: The Codebreakers' Trap That Turned the Pacific War
At about 10:22 on the morning of June 4, 1942, American dive bombers tipped over above four Japanese aircraft carriers in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. Six months earlier, those same four ships — Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu — had launched the attack on Pearl Harbor. In the space of a few minutes, three of them were burning wrecks. By the next day, all four were gone.
The Battle of Midway is often told as a miracle — a lucky American gamble that paid off against impossible odds. It was not luck. It was a trap, laid with information stolen from the enemy's own radio traffic, and sprung by pilots who flew into the teeth of a stronger fleet. It is the story of how a handful of codebreakers in a basement, and a squadron of dive bombers that almost turned back, changed the course of the Second World War.
The two letters: “AF”
By the spring of 1942, Japan had won every battle it had fought in the Pacific. Pearl Harbor, Singapore, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies — the Imperial Japanese Navy seemed unstoppable, and its commander, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, was planning the next blow: an operation to seize Midway Atoll, a tiny American-held island group about 1,300 miles northwest of Honolulu, and then lure the remaining American carriers into a decisive battle on Japanese terms.
The Americans knew something big was coming. They knew it because of a small team of codebreakers working in a windowless basement beneath the headquarters of the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor — the Navy's Combat Intelligence Unit, known by its code name, Station Hypo. Led by Commander Joseph Rochefort, the unit had been working against JN-25, the Japanese Navy's main operational code, and by March 1942 it was reading enough of the enemy's messages to track Japanese plans.
The intercepted traffic pointed to a major operation against a target the Japanese called “AF.” Rochefort was convinced AF was Midway. His superiors in Washington were not.
So Rochefort devised a test. In mid-May, Midway was instructed by secure cable to send a plain-language radio message — uncoded, for anyone to hear — reporting that the island's fresh-water distillation plant had broken down. Within days, Hypo intercepted a Japanese message reporting that “AF is short of water.” AF was Midway, and the trap could be set.
There is one nuance the popular version of this story often gets wrong. As the historian Craig Symonds has pointed out, the water ruse was not how Rochefort first identified AF — he was already sure. He staged it to convince Washington. The ruse was proof, not discovery.
Armed with the date of the attack and the Japanese order of battle, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, positioned his three available carriers — Enterprise, Hornet and the hastily repaired Yorktown — northeast of Midway, at a point the Americans called “Point Luck,” to wait in ambush. Yorktown had been badly damaged a month earlier at the Battle of the Coral Sea; the Pearl Harbor yard had first estimated three months to repair her. Nimitz gave them three days, and they delivered her in under 72 hours.
Four carriers against three
The odds still looked terrible. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's First Carrier Striking Force, the Kidō Butai, brought four fleet carriers and 248 carrier aircraft to the battle, backed by battleships, cruisers and destroyers under Yamamoto's overall command. The Americans had three carriers and about 360 aircraft in total, including the planes based on Midway itself. Japan's plan was to bomb Midway flat, then destroy whatever American carriers came to its rescue.
On the morning of June 4, Japanese aircraft struck Midway from about 06:30. The island's Marine garrison took heavy losses, but the airfield survived. Nagumo, believing no American carriers were nearby, ordered the planes held in reserve on Akagi and Kaga re-armed — torpedoes swapped for land bombs, to hit Midway again. Then, at 07:28, a scout plane reported American ships to the northeast. The re-arming was halted halfway. The Japanese carriers were left with decks crowded with fuelled and armed aircraft, bombs stacked in the hangars, and no time to sort out the mess.
That disorder was the opening the Americans needed. But first, someone had to pay for it.
The morning of June 4
The first American strikes were a disaster. Torpedo bombers — slow, obsolete TBD Devastators — attacked from about 09:20 and again at 10:20, flying straight into the Japanese fighter screen with almost no success. Torpedo Squadron 8, launched from Hornet, was wiped out: of fifteen aircraft, only one man survived, Ensign George Gay, who watched the rest of the battle floating in the sea.
Yet the sacrifice did something the torpedo planes could not do themselves. It pulled the Japanese combat air patrol down to sea level, chasing the last torpedo bombers, and left the sky above the carriers empty.
At about 10:22, Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky's dive bombers from Enterprise arrived overhead — and found the Japanese carriers below them, decks covered with aircraft, fuel and bombs. McClusky had almost turned back for lack of fuel; instead he had followed the wake of a Japanese destroyer, Arashi, racing to rejoin the fleet, and it led him straight to the target. Within minutes, Akagi, Kaga and Soryu were all in flames. Nimitz later called McClusky's decision “one of the most important decisions of the battle.”
The popular phrase “the fatal five minutes” is shorthand, not a clock: the three carriers were mortally wounded in a matter of minutes, and the core of Japan's carrier force — the ships that had attacked Pearl Harbor — was destroyed.
The SBD Dauntless dive bomber was the weapon that did it: a rugged, accurate aircraft that could put a 1,000-pound bomb onto a moving ship from 20,000 feet. The pilots who flew it that morning, McClusky and Max Leslie of Yorktown's dive-bomber squadron among them, delivered the blow that the torpedo squadrons had died trying to make possible.
Hiryu's reply — and Yorktown's end
One Japanese carrier survived the morning: Hiryu. Her aircraft launched two strikes against the American carriers, and both found Yorktown. Bomb hits came just after noon; torpedo hits followed in the afternoon, and by 14:55 Yorktown was abandoned, listing and burning.
She was not finished. At about 17:00, dive bombers from Enterprise and Hornet found Hiryu and hit her with at least four 1,000-pound bombs. She burned through the night. Kaga and Soryu sank on the evening of June 4; Akagi and Hiryu were scuttled the next day.
The fighting was not over. On June 6, American dive bombers sank the heavy cruiser Mikuma and damaged her sister ship Mogami. And on that same day, as salvage crews worked aboard the still-floating Yorktown, the Japanese submarine I-168 slipped through the destroyer screen and fired four torpedoes. Two struck Yorktown; one struck the destroyer Hammann, which was alongside providing power — she broke in two and sank within minutes, with about 80 men lost. Yorktown stayed afloat through the night, then capsized and sank at dawn on June 7.
The battle had one more witness whose film survives. The director John Ford was on Midway during the attack, filming for the US Navy, and was wounded by shrapnel. His 18-minute documentary, “The Battle of Midway,” released later in 1942, won one of the first Academy Awards for Best Documentary. It is mentioned here, not embedded, because its public-domain status could not be confirmed.
Why Midway mattered
The butcher's bill tells the story in numbers. Japan lost all four of its fleet carriers and the heavy cruiser Mikuma, 248 carrier aircraft, and 3,057 men. The United States lost the carrier Yorktown and the destroyer Hammann, about 150 aircraft, and 307 men.
But the numbers alone miss the point. The four carriers were not just ships: they carried more than a hundred of Japan's best-trained naval aviators and the veteran flight-deck crews who had made the Kidō Butai the most feared carrier force in the world. Japan could build new carriers. It could not replace those men. As the military historian John Keegan wrote, Midway was “the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare.”
The battle brought the Pacific naval forces of Japan and the United States to approximate parity, and it ended Japan's offensive in the Pacific. Two months later, in August 1942, American Marines landed on Guadalcanal — the United States was on the attack, and stayed on the attack for the rest of the war.
That does not mean the war was won at Midway — Japan fought on for three more years, and American naval supremacy took many more months to become clear. But the direction of the war changed there, in a few minutes on a June morning, because a codebreaker in a basement had read two letters correctly — and because the pilots who found the enemy fleet did not turn back.
Like the Night Witches, the Soviet women who flew night bombing missions in the same war, the men of Midway fought a battle that turned on intelligence, courage, and an enemy that believed its own plan could not fail. For more stories from the war, browse the World Wars archive.
Watch the story on ChroniVara:
References
- National WWII Museum — “Battle of Midway”
- Encyclopaedia Britannica — “Battle of Midway”
- Smithsonian Magazine — “The True Story of the Battle of Midway”
- US Navy, CHIPS — “Station Hypo and its Impact on the Battle of Midway”
- US Navy — “Naval Aviation History: The Battle of Midway”
- History.com — “How Codebreakers Helped the Allies Win the Battle of Midway”
- National Security Agency / US Department of Defense — “The Battle of Midway” (cryptologic history paper)
- US Naval Institute Archives — Battle of Midway online exhibition
- Wikipedia — “The Battle of Midway (film)”
Fact notes: Sources date the battle differently — the National WWII Museum and Smithsonian give 3–7 June 1942; Britannica gives 3–6 June. This article uses 3–7 June, with the decisive fighting on 4 June and Yorktown sinking at dawn on 7 June (accounts give 05:00 and 07:01 for the sinking; only “at dawn” is stated). American deaths are given as 307 by the National WWII Museum; Britannica gives 317. Japanese aircraft losses are given as 248 carrier aircraft by the Museum; Britannica's higher figure (320+) includes other losses and is not used. The “five minutes” shorthand for the dive-bomber strike is corrected in the text. Admiral Nimitz's contemporary estimate of 4,800 Japanese dead is now regarded as an overestimate and is not used as the figure.


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